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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE AND LELAND STALEY, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
CASE NO. 050916251 
vs, 
CHRISTOPHER JOLLES & NORTHERN 
UTAH HEALTHCARE CORP. dba ST. 
MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs have moved this Court to compel discovery and 
ask leave to amend their Complaint, which motions were before the 
Court for hearing on October 18, 2007. Having considered the 
motions, memoranda, and argument submitted by the parties, the 
Court enters the following order: 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Christopher Jolles performed a hysterectomy upon 
Plaintiff Denise Staley (the "Planitiff") on April 10, 2003. The 
Plaintiff was admitted to the post-operation wing ("Four West") 
of Defendant St. Mark's Hospital (the "Defendant").l The 
Plaintiff alleges that during her first night in Four West, her 
1
 Defendant Christopher Jolles has neither opposed nor 
supported the Plaintiffs' motions. As such, references to the 
"Defendant" in this memorandum relate only to Northern Utah 
Healthcare Corp. 
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blood pressure dropped dramatically, causing severe kidney 
damage. She asserts that proper monitoring by the Defendant's 
staff would have prevented this injury. 
DISCUSSION 
Two of the Plaintiff's motions are before the Court: a 
motion to compel discovery and a motion for leave to amend her 
complaint. The Court will address each in turn. 
A, Motion to Compel 
The Plaintiff moves this Court to compel discovery, 
asserting that the Defendant has been dilatory in producing 
documents and witnesses. She specifically asks this Court to 
compel the production of (1) complete personnel files of relevant 
staff members, (2) documents relating to patient acuity, and (3) 
four witnesses. She also asks the Court to impose discovery 
sanctions. 
At oral argument the Defendant admitted that it was dilatory 
in producing the documents and apologized for the delay. It also 
explained that some of the requested documents do not exist, and 
therefore cannot be produced. 
1. Personnel Files 
In April 2007, the Plaintiff sought production of the 
personnel files for each staff member who cared for the 
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Plaintiff. {See Certificate of Service, filed April 25, 2007; 
Response to Fifth Set of Requests for Production of Documents, 
filed May 11, 2007, attached at Plaintiff's Memo in Support, Ex. 
D). In May the Defendant objected to this request as overbroad, 
but expressed that "it (was] willing to produce the requested 
files . . . for those employees that Plaintiff identifies as 
having breached the applicable standard of care in their 
treatment of Plaintiff." (Id.). 
In preparation for depositions scheduled for Tuesday, July 
31, 2007, the Plaintiff identified the nurses as the staff who 
"were negligent in their care and treatment of plaintiff." 
(Letter, July 13, 2007, attached at Plaintiff's Memo in Support, 
Ex. E) . In response, the Defendant responded that none of the 
Plaintiff's discovery requests sought "the personnel files for 
the nurses in question" and invited the Plaintiff to make a 
formal discovery request naming each nurse. (Letter, July 27, 
2007, attached at Plaintiff's Memo in Support, Ex. F) . This 
letter was faxed to the Plaintiff the Friday before the July 31 
deposition. The Plaintiff conducted the scheduled depositions 
without the benefit of the deposed's personnel files. 
In response to a more specific discovery request, the 
Defendant produced personnel files for the nurses who were 
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deposed in July, However, it withheld several portions, 
asserting they were not relevant and were privileged as "care 
review" documents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §26-25-1, et seq. 
At oral argument, the Defendant conceded that its objection under 
the care review privilege was overbroad, and withdrew that 
objection. Instead, it objects to the production of any records 
created after the incident as irrelevant. 
The Plaintiff correctly notes that such evidence may indeed 
be relevant. For instance, evidence that staff neglected to 
properly monitor other patients would bear directly on testimony 
regarding that witness's care of the Plaintiff. The reports 
could also provide impeachment evidence. In any case, even if 
these documents would be inadmissible at trial, at the discovery 
stage the Plaintiff is entitled to the production of any 
information ''reasonably calculated "to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
The Court orders the production of complete personnel files 
for each staff member deposed on July 31,2 as well as the 
2
 According to the notice of deposition, the deposed staff 
were Angela Stallings, Maelene Lee, Melissa Lewis, Robyn Phelps, 
and Jennifer Nicholas. 
4 
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complete personnel files of the witnesses sought for deposition.3 
The Defendant will produce these personnel files within thirty 
(30) days of the entry of this Order. Although the Court 
anticipates full disclosure, if the Defendant asserts the care 
review privilege with regard to any portion of the personnel 
files, the materials must be presented to the Court for in camera 
inspection within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this 
order, or the Court will construe objection as having been 
waived. 
2. Acuity Documents 
The Plaintiff complains that the Defendant has refused to 
produce documents recording patient acuity for patients on Four 
West on April 10, 11, and 12, 2003. She contends that her 
request for patient counts in January 2007 was broad enough to 
obtain these documents. In her July 13, 2007 letter, the 
Plaintiff specifically requested patient acuity documents for 
these dates. After a discussion between counsel, the Plaintiff 
filed a formal request reflecting this request. (See Response to 
3
 This includes Emily Pledger, How-Su Chen, Koco Henseler, 
and Susan Clayton. The day before hearing this matter, the 
Defendant identified Ms. Clayton as the charge nurse over Four 
West from 7:00 am on April 11. The Defendant has represented to 
the Court that Ms, Pledger's personnel file cannot be located, 
but that it will produce the file if it is found. 
5 
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Plaintiff's Tenth Request, attached at Plaintiff's Reply, Ex. D). 
The Defendant has explained that Four West does not keep 
documentation regarding patient acuity, and that the only way to 
extrapolate such information would be to produce the medical 
files of each patient staying on Four West during the relevant 
dates and attempt to develop an assessment from these. Neither 
party desires the production of these medical files. 
The Plaintiff seeks an order for the Defendant to perform an 
exhaustive search of its records for documents relating to 
acuity. She also has requested an evidentiary hearing in which 
caretakers and staff would be questioned regarding the existence 
of such materials. The Court declines these invitations. 
Instead, it orders the Defendant to review the medical files of 
Four West patients on April 10, 11, and 12, 2003, and, if 
possible, to draw together data regarding patient acuity and 
produce a chart reflecting that data. Such production will not 
invade the privacy of the other patients, but will provide the 
Plaintiff with the information needed to assess whether the 
hospital was under-staffed on the dates in question. The acuity 
documentation will be produced within thirty (30) days of the 
entry of this order. If the documentation is not provided, then 
within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order the Defendant 
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must produce a succinct statement, made under oath by an 
appropriate person, concerning how acuity is assessed and 
communicated between staff on Four West. 
3. Witnesses 
The Plaintiff has specifically asked this Court to order the 
production of four witnesses for deposition: Emily Pledger, How-
Su Chen, Emily Henseler, and Susan Clayton. The Defendant shall 
produce these witnesses for deposition within two weeks of the 
production of their personnel files. If their files cannot be 
located, the Defendant shall produce the witnesses for deposition 
within forty-four (44) days of the entry of this order. 
The Court urges the Defendant to timely respond to the 
Plaintiff's requests to set dates for depositions in this case. 
4. Sanctions 
The Defendant has been dilatory in providing names, 
witnesses, and documents in this case, and much of the requested 
information was not provided to the Plaintiff until after she 
filed motions to compel. The Court orders the Defendant to pay 
the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the Plaintiff in 
bringing this motion to compel. The Plaintiff shall submit an 
affidavit pursuant to Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
limited to bringing and arguing the Motion to Compel. 
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B. Motion for Leave to Amend 
The Plaintiff asks this Court for leave to amend her 
Complaint to include a charge of reckless indifference. She 
alleges that the Defendant intentionally understaffed Four West, 
showing reckless indifference toward the safety of its patients. 
Punitive damages are available in such cases. 
During the deposition of CNA Maelene Lee, Ms. Lee testified 
about under-staffing, complaints to management, and the 
management's failure to provide more staff. She further 
testified that the high volume of patients was stressful. The 
Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to include a charge of 
reckless indifference, alleging that the Defendant intentionally 
understaffed Four West for budgetary reasons. The Plaintiff 
cites a class action complaint filed in a Kansas federal district 
court (the "Spires Complaint"), in which the plaintiff alleges a 
policy of understaffing. This action was dismissed by the 
district court, and the allegations have not been verified or 
attested. As such, the Court will not consider the Spires 
Complaint in making this determination. 
Generally, when considering whether to grant a motion for 
leave to amend, the Court considers three factors: timeliness, 
justification, and prejudice. See Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
Staley v. Jolles PAGE 9 ORDER 
2003 UT App 355, J16, 78 P. 3d 988. But the Court may also 
consider any other factors relevant to the particular case, 
including the futility of an amendment. See Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P. 2d 1273, 1282 
(Utah 1998). 
1. Timeliness, Justification, and Prejudice 
The Defendant complains that the amendment comes too late, 
as fact discovery was scheduled to end last month. As discussed 
above, however, the Defendant's dilatory discovery tactics are 
partially to blame for the Plaintiff's delay. It cannot fairly 
complain of timeliness when it has been dilatory in providing the 
facts necessary to frame the claim. The Plaintiff is also 
justified in her delayed amendment, as the facts supporting the 
claim only recently came to light. In addition, the parties have 
stipulated to a two-month extension of fact discovery. This 
extension should counter any prejudice to the Defendant. 
2. Futility of Amendment 
Generally, "a court may deny a motion to amend as futile if 
the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss." 
Jenson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1139, 82 P.3d 1076. 
Accepting the amended facts as true, the Court concludes that the 
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to 
9 
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dismiss.4 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the 
Plaintiff must allege conduct manifesting "a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1 (1) (a) (2007). The Plaintiff alleges that 
the Defendant intentionally understaffed its hospital to increase 
its profits, knowingly putting its patients at risk, and that 
this understaffing proximately caused the Plaintiff's injuries. 
The Court is persuaded by the Plaintiff that such conduct, if 
true, would constitute knowing and reckless indifference. E.g., 
Beverly Enterprises-Florida v. Spilman, 661 So.2d 867, 870 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1995); Miller v. Levering Reg'l Health Care Ctr., LLC, 
202 S.W.3d 614, 617-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). The Plaintiff's 
amended claim would likely survive a motion to dismiss, and 
therefore would not be futile. 
The Court finds that justice requires that the Plaintiff be 
4
 The Defendant urges this Court to consider the evidence in 
the record in making its determination, citing Pender v. Bird, 
224 P.2d 1057 (Utah 1950). In Pender, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed a trial court's denial of a motion to amend because it 
would not have prevailed in light of the evidence produced at 
trial. Id. at 1059. The evidence considered by the Utah Supreme 
Court was not limited to record evidence present when the Court 
denied the motion. The Pender court essentially affirmed on 
grounds of harmless error, and did not condone the consideration 
of record evidence. The Court therefore declines the Defendant's 
invitation to consider the pieces of evidence currently in the 
record, and will instead follow the traditional standard in 
considering a motion to dismiss, i.e. assuming the truth of 
alleged facts. 
10 
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reckless indifference. 
Although the Court will allow the amendment, it is wary that 
the Pi a :i i itiff may seek broad discovery of conditions unrelated to 
her stay in Four West. The Plaintiff is admonished to narrowly 
tailor her discovery requests to documents relating to staffing 
conditions in Four West on or around the date she was admitted. 
Similarly, the P.] a:i nti ff shoi i.3 d request on] y doci lmentati on. of 
complaints going to conditions that would have rectified her 
situation, not complaints of over-staffing in the hospital 
generally. 
C. Discovery Extensions 
In light of the preceding rulings, the Court will address 
the various discovery deadlines which have passed and will soon 
pass . The par t i es have s t ipul a ted t: :> a twc i i: toi iti I extei isi on D f 
the fact discovery deadline, which was initially set for 
September 28, 2007. In addition, the Court will extend all 
discovery and d i sposi t:i ve motion deadlines by sixty days The 
Court strikes the trial scheduled to begin on April 14, 2 008. 
The Court's calendar currently has openings large enough to 
accommodate jury trial in this case in June 2 008. However, the 
Court's calendar is filling quickly. The parties should confer 
and jointly contact the Court's clerk, Kathryn Westwood, at 
11 
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that the scheduled trial date will not be disturbed again absent 
a showing of cause sufficient to justify another continuation. 
D. Professionalism and Civility 
w[T]he Standards of Professionalism and Civility, 
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court, urge lawyers to 'avoid 
hostile/ demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral 
communications with adversaries. '" Advanced Restoration L L t\ 
v. Priskos, 2005 UT App 505, 537 n.13, 126 P.3d 786 (quoting Utah 
Standards of Professionalism & Civility 3) Nor shall an 
attorney "without adequate factual basis, atti ibi ite to : tl ler 
counsel . improper motives, purpose, or conduct." Utah 
Standards of Professionalism & Civility 3. "Credibility is often 
directly tied to civility and professi onal ism." Peters ; • Pine 
Meadows Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, S[21, 151 P.3d 962. 
The Standards also counsel attorneys "to consult with other 
counsel so that depositions, hearings, and conferences are 
scheduled at mutually convenient times." Utah Standards of 
Professionalism & Civility 15. It also forbids lawyers to uuse 
or oppose discovery for the purpose of harassment or to burden an 
opponent with increased litigation expense." Id. at I Such 
tactics, while sometimes providing temporary advantage, 
Staley 3olles PAGE 13 > W -
ultimately damage the attorney's reputation and credit;..ty with 
the Court and other counsel. 
"While these standards are not binding," the Utah Supreme 
Court has "encourage [d] n lembers of t:l le 1: ar to sti i :iy and f ol ] <: ^  
them," Peters, 2007 UT 2, 122. Attorneys who disregard these 
standards often harm their clients by doing so. See id. at 121. 
Th e Co i i. r t i: em i n d s co nil s e ] f o i t 1 i e p a r t i e s o f t h e s e St an d a r d s 
and urges their employment in all matters pertaining to this 
case. 
ORDER 
Within thirty days of the entry of this order, the Defendant 
shall deliver to the Plaintiff complete personnel files for each 
witness who has been deposed or has been identified for 
deposition. It must also produce documents relating to patieiit 
acuity on April 10 "'• , and 12, 2003, which it can collect from 
patient files. In the event it cannot produce these documents, 
it must produce evidence explaining how patient acuity is 
assessed and communicated on Four West. Any assertion of 
privilege regarding these documents is waived unless made within 
twenty-one days of the entry of this order. 
Within fourteen days of the production of their complete 
personnel files, the Defendant must produce How-Su Chen, Koco 
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Henseler, Susan Clayton, and Emily Pledger for deposition. If 
the personnel files of any of these individuals cannot be 
located, the witnesses shall be presented for deposition within 
six weeks from the entry of this order. 
The Defendant is ordered to compensate the Plaintiff for her 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing this motion. The 
Plaintiff si ia.1.3 sul >-. rule 73 affidavi t I J1 „ai R i i" f" 7 L 
The Plaintiff is granted leave to file her First Amended 
Complaint. 
DATED this ^ ^ T day of October, 2 007. 
14 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage-paid, to the following: 
DAVID B. CUTT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD HONAKER 
HONAKER LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 366 
Rock Springs, WY 82902 
MARK A. RIEKHOF 
JENIFER RIES-BUNTAIN, Pro Hac Vice 
Attorneys for Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Christopher J. Jolles 
P.O. Box 45678 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
us22z DATED thisC/ y day of October, 2007. 
Cour t C l e r k 
M0>\ 
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MARK A. RIEKHOF #8420 
JENNIFER RJES-BUNTAIN, Pro Hoc Vice 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 320-0900 
Facsimile: (801) 320-0896 
Attorneys for Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation, d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital 
BEFORE THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT ATE OF UTAH 
DENISE STALEY 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER JOLLES, M.D. and 
NORTHERN UTAH HEALTHCARE 
CORPORATION, d/b/a ST. MARK'S 
HOSPITAL 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF HOW-SU CHEN IN 
RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM AND 
DECISION ORDER OF OCTOBER 22, 
2007 
Civil No.: 050916251 
Hon. Judge Kate Toomey 
C\ ** ^ i Chen, state that I have personal knowledge of all the facts in this Affidavit 
ami ' called upon to testify, I could and would testify as follows: 
1 • ' \s Hospital. In that position, I am 
responsible for day to day operations on the unit as well as staffing. 
iALTu.- ""Hi 
2 j | i a v e v^oj-^ed as a registered nurse for over 40 years and at St. Mark's Hospital for over 
27 y*Mis. 
3. 4W is a medical-sur^ nat takes patients that are stable enough not to require 
1< 'I I en lelemrtTV monitoring. 
4.' I ha \ e beei I asked t : it e ' 'ri :rv t l ic n ledical files of 120 j ^ atieiits admitted to 4W from April 
10-12, 2003 and prepare a chart of acuity for purposes of assessing staffing. 
5. I was provided access to the patient's charts and have reviewed the staffing sheets from 
April 10-12,2003. 
6. While at some institutions and on some floors, acuity is reduced to a numerical 
expi ession of the con iplexit> of tl ic patient v e do not pi esentlj use such a system on 4W at St. 
Mark's and did not use such a system in 2003. On 4W, acuity is not a number or a graph nor is it 
the only factor that is considered in staffing. Rather, it is part of a continuing evaluation that 
takes numerous factors into consideration. On 4\\ wi iln jml itvsigit each p in uf ,i IUUIKH I i 
code or create a specific chart of acuity; Additionally, patient's needs and demands on a nurse 
i i m differ greatly even, w i 1:1 i ai i identical medical condition, v* ^-- : •• v\ to create a chart or 
code system, particularly years after the fact would be artificial and misleading. 
2 
45 
17 
7. 1 "he first evaluation of le\ el of care is an evaluation mi ide b) • the physician and applied 
through the physician's orders Depending on the physician's determination, a patient will be 
s S:UIH*' : • ' ••' :,-- .•»!. -vNuri: '- A particular 
level of monitoring may be ordered depending on the physician's medical assessment of that 
patient. Post-operative patient's like Denise Staley are frequently assigned to 4W bj their 
physicians. 
8. With respect to the determination for nurse staffing, acuity is primarily assessed in terms 
of the particular patient's needs during a particular shift. This assessment involves a myriad of 
• ai iables sue! i as the patient's overall condition (including the need for Q0mpiex technology and 
equipment, wound/drain care, medication administration, pain level, vital signs, dependent care 
needs, mobility, psychosocial/emotional status and family dynamics, to name a few) in addition 
to the edi lcatioi i and si ;:ill mix of staff, ai noi lg othei ii icli v idi lalized factors. ' 11 lese facte i s can 
change significantly from shift to shift. The primary source of information about these factors 
for staffing is obtained from oral discussions with the patient's nursing care providers at the time 
staffing is being assessed. 
9 Staffing, or the assignment of certain patients to certain nurses, is a multi-factorial 
process that begins with a count of the number of patients and reference to a staffing matrix 
aM i e l <-d > i - .• ^ --, , iw
 t 
certain number of patients. The patients are then assigned to tlle particular nurses for a given 
shift as shown on the staffing sheet attached as Exhibit 2. In making the assignments, the 
3 
variables of patient's needs noted above are considered along with patient preferences, nurse 
preferences, room location, past assignments and nurse availability among other variables that 
may arise. Additional staffing options are always available should needs change even during a 
shift. Staffing on the unit can be rearranged, other nurses can assist with a particular patient, an 
on-call nurse can be summoned, nurses from other floors can assist and patients can be 
transferred to other floors. 
10. I have reviewed the nurse staffing levels for the period of April 10-12, 2003 and note that 
the number of nurses met or exceeded the hospital's guidelines for staffing. I have also reviewed 
the charts of the patients assigned to Angela Stallings on the night shift of April 10-11. While it 
is impossible to recreate the specific factors that would have led to the assignment of Ms. 
Stallings to those specific patients, the condition of those patients was consistent with the 
expected patients on 4W. Their assignment to Ms. Stallings was an appropriate staffing level for 
a medical/surgical unit. 
11. I have also reviewed the CNA staffing for the period of April 10-12, 2003 and note that 
the number of CNA's met the hospital's guidelines for staffing as well. The CNA's would have 
been assigned to no more than 12 patients on the night shift and 9 patients on the day shift which 
is an appropriate level for a medical/surgical unit. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
4 
47 
19 
Verification 
Under penalties as provided by the laws of the State of Utah, the undersigned certifies 
that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein 
stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as 
aforesaid that she verily believes the same to be true. 
How-Su Clfaen 
Director of 4W, St. Mark's Hospital 
Subscribed and Sworn before me this Sll day of _ Afi ^(mijY\ 2007 
££?15£E L O P E Z GU-LANE 
NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH 
139 E. SO TEMPl£, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CfTY, UT 8411M128 
My Comm. Exp. 02/23/2009 
i ivyv^u 
NOTAR 
M&ftoO 
DATED this 21st day of November, 2007. 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
STARK A. RIEKBOF 
Attorneys for Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation, d/b/a 
St. Mark's Hospital 
5 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF HOW-SU 
CHEN IN RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM AND DECISION ORDER OF OCTOBER 
22, 2007 was mailed, postage prepaid, this 21st day of November, 2007, to the following: 
David A. Cutt 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST, P.C. 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Elliott J. Williams 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Attorneys for Defendant Christopher J. Jolles, M.D. 
W^faUut, 
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EXHIBIT 1 
50 
22 
HCA St. Mark's Hospital 
4 South telepts =1.25 med/surgpts on AM 
4 South tele pts = 1.2 med surg pts on PM 
STAFFING PATTERNS 
3 West, 4 West, 5 West 
1-10 12hr 
CNA/CLRK 
11 12 hr 
CNA/CLRK 
12 12 hr 
CNA/CLRK 
13 8hrs 
14 8hrs 
15 8hrs 
16 8hrs 
17 8hrs 
8hrs 
19 8hrs 
20 12hrs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE STALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER JOLLES, M.D., et al. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 050916251 
Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation has filed an objection to discovery, 
and the Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel the production of medical records, which were 
submitted for decision on February 22, 2008 and March 5, 2008, respectively.1 On April 
18, 2008 the Court requested, and the parties have provided, additional briefing touching 
upon the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its role in this 
case. The parties have requested a hearing, but the Court does not feel argument is 
necessary to resolve the motions. Having considered the parties' arguments, the Court 
enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order: 
BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiff alleges medical malpractice against the Defendants following a surgery 
performed at St. Mark's Hospital, which is owned by Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation 
(the "Defendant"). Following surgery, she was monitored on the Four West wing of St. 
1
 Defendant Christopher Jolles is not involved in these motions. 
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Mark's. She alleges that her blood pressure dropped dramatically during her first night in 
the hospital, causing kidney damage. 
The Plaintiff previously filed a motion to compel the discovery of documents and 
witnesses, which was heard by the Court on October 18, 2007, and upon which the Court 
issued a decision on October 22, 2007. In that motion the Plaintiff sought, among other 
things, any documents showing patient acuity for the occupants of Four West. Patient 
acuity refers to the amount of care or monitoring a patient requires. Although such 
documents are kept in many hospitals and in various circumstances, the Defendant 
maintains that the nurses on Four West do not document acuity assessments. The 
Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges that Four West was understaffed, which contributed 
to her injuries. Patients with high acuity require more care, increasing the wing's staffing 
needs. Thus, patient acuity is relevant to her claim. 
In an attempt to avoid the disclosure of medical files, the Court ordered the 
Defendant to review the medical files of the other patients staying at Four West and 
produce a chart containing data related to patient acuity. (See Memorandum Decision and 
Order, 10/22/07, at 6). In the event this chart could not be provided, the Defendant was 
ordered to produce a statement discussing how patient acuity is assessed and 
communicated between staff on Four West. (Id. at 6-7). The Defendant took the latter 
course of action, producing the affidavit of How-Su Chen. ("Chen Aff.") (attached at 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Discovery Request, Ex. E). Ms. 
Chen explains that staffing needs are assessed in terms of the patients' needs on a 
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particular shift. {Id. at % 8). While acuity plays a role in these decisions, she is unable to 
create a chart summarizing patient acuity because patient needs change from shift to shift 
and cannot be recreated solely from the medical files. Id. Patient acuity is assessed and 
communicated through oral discussions with the patient's care providers. 
Ms. Chen's affidavit went somewhat beyond the scope of the Court's order, 
however, further concluding that the number of nurses on duty exceeded the hospital's 
guidelines for staffing, and that Ms. Angela Stallings, who cared for the Plaintiff, was given 
an appropriate number of patients. (Id. at ^ 10). She made this assessment by reviewing 
the six files of the patients in Ms. Stalling's care. Id. 
DISCUSSION 
The Plaintiff asks this Court to compel the production of redacted patient files for 
those patients in Ms. Stallings's care. She contends that it would be unfair for Ms. Chen 
to testify about acuity on the basis of medical files which have not been produced. 
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant 
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery " Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 
parties agree that patient acuity is relevant to the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant 
intentionally overstaffed Four West. The Plaintiff has stipulated to receiving the records 
with personally identifying information redacted, and under a protective order. Thus, the 
only remaining question before the Court is whether the physician-patient privilege prohibits 
the production of six non-party patients' medical records, with personally identifying 
information redacted and subject to a protective order. 
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A. Utah's Physician-Patient Privilege 
The physician-patient privilege is controlled by Rule 506, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 506(c), the Defendant is "presumed to have authority during 
the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient." Utah R. Evid. 506(c).2 
The privilege covers "diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given," as well as 
"information obtained by examination of the patient and information transmitted among a 
patient, a physician .. ., and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment 
under the direction of the physician." Id. at 506(b). 
The Plaintiff seeks medical records containing information described in Rule 506, 
but seeks to avoid the privilege's application by having personal information redacted from 
the medical files and subjecting the files to a protective order. Redaction, she asserts, 
provides her with information regarding patient acuity while protecting the identity of the 
patients. The Defendant disagrees, arguing that redaction does not adequately protect the 
privacy interests of the non-party patients. 
The parties' arguments require the Court to weigh the privacy rights of patients on 
one hand against allowable discovery in a civil litigation on the other. This issue is one of 
first impression in Utah, and the Court will seek guidance from our sister jurisdictions in 
rendering its decision. The Defendant has presented four theories upon which it argues 
the Court should prevent disclosure of the non-party patient files: (1) that the purposes of 
2
 The Plaintiff has not attempted to overcome this presumption. See Bums v. 
Boyden, 2006 UT 14, H 26, 133 P.3d 370. 
30 
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the privilege necessarily protect any information compiled during treatment, regardless of 
a threat of identification; (2) that the rule's plain language does not allow redaction; (3) that 
redaction does not provide sufficient protection against identification; and (4) that the 
documents are only marginally relevant to the case. The first three arguments lead to the 
same conclusion: non-party medical files may not be produced in any form, in any case 
involving third-parties. The fourth is limited to the facts of this case. The Court will address 
each argument in turn. 
1. Purpose and Scope of Physician-Patient Privilege 
It is universally accepted that the intended purpose of the physician-patient privilege 
is to protect the privacy rights of patients. The Defendant argues that the privilege should 
extend to all information within a medical file, and that redaction does not render the 
remainder of the file non-privileged. The Plaintiff contends that the privacy rights of 
patients is adequately protected by redaction and protective orders. 
From the Court's review of the cases, there appear to be two major schools of 
thought in the consideration and application of the privilege. These schools differ in their 
assessment of how far the privilege must extend in order to protect patient privacy. In one 
school, which represents a clear majority of jurisdictions, the privilege extends only so far 
as the patient could be identified through the records produced. E.g., Ziegler v. Super. Ct. 
inandforCty, of Pima, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1982), Under this school of thought, medical 
records may be discovered by a third party, so long as information which could identify the 
patient is redacted. Privilege laws are applied to prevent a party from establishing a 
STALEY v. JOLLES PAGE 6 ORDER 
connection between a patient's identity and information. 
Under the second school, however, the medical information itself is sacrosanct. 
E.g., Ortiz v Ikeda, No. 99C010-032-JTV, 2001 WL 660107, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 193 
(Del. Super. Ct. 2001). No amount of redaction sufficiently protects the privacy of non-
party patients under this theory, and divulging any evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment 
constitutes a violation of their privacy. Those who subscribe to this school of thought 
prevent the production of any document produced in the course of a patient's care, unless 
it falls within a specific exception under the statute or rule. A more detailed discussion of 
both philosophies may be helpful. 
a. Majority School of Thought 
As Plaintiff notes, the majority of jurisdictions view the privilege as extending only 
so far as there is a danger of identifying the patient. The California Supreme Court has 
aptly summarized this philosophy; 
The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the humiliation of the 
patient that might follow disclosure of his ailments. Therefore if the 
disclosure of the patient's name reveals nothing of any communication 
concerning the patient's ailments, disclosure of the patient's name does not 
violate the privilege. If, however, disclosure of the patient's name inevitably 
in the context of such disclosure reveals the confidential information, namely 
the ailments, then such disclosure violates the privilege. Conversely, if the 
disclosure reveals the ailments but not the patient's identity, then such 
disclosure would not appear to violate the privilege. 
Rudnick v. Superior Court of Kern County, 144 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 n. 13 (Cal. 1974) 
(citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the disclosure 
of a patient's identity alone may violate the privilege if the context will reveal their condition 
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or treatment. But records without personally identifying information are not subject to the 
privilege because they essentially become the records of anonymous patients. One court 
recognized that redacted medical records are fundamentally different from their unedited 
counterparts. "[T]he search for truth may require the disclosure of redacted medical 
records of nonparty patients even though the unedited records are protected by the 
physician-patient privilege." Baptist Memorial Hospital-Union County v. Johnson, 754 
So.2d 1165, 1169 (Miss. 2000). 
In Ziegler, the court quoted a pronouncement of the privilege's purpose similar to 
that embraced by our courts: " tha t ' . . . the former patients are entitled to be left to their 
privacy secure in the belief that their confidences, treatment, and records are protected 
from disclosure.'" Ziegler, 656 P.2d at 1254 (citation omitted). It noted that this 
pronouncement "must be construed in context, i.e. disclosure of the identities of former 
patients of the doctors." Id. (emphasis added). Because the order in Ziegler did not 
require such disclosure, there was no betrayal of those patients' privacy interests. Another 
court ruled that "[o]nce the information cannot be connected with the patient, the risk of 
embarrassment that might lead a patient to withhold information from a physician and thus 
interfere with proper treatment, as well as the risk of any invasion of personal privacy, is 
eliminated." In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 178 F. Supp. 2d 412,415 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
Additionally, these courts recognize that privacy and litigation interests are not the 
only policies at issue in this debate. Disclosure of medical records increases transparency 
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in medical care, giving providers additional incentives to provide proper training and care 
for their patients. See e.g., Ziegler, 656 P.2d at 1255 (holding that disclosure "furthers the 
public interest by insuring that hospitals will more scrupulously supervise the members of 
their medical staffs and prevent exposure of future patients to medical incompetence."). 
Numerous other courts protect patient privacy only to the extent necessary to 
preserve anonymity. See Cochran v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641, 
645 (W.D. Ark. 1995); Community Hosp. Ass'n v. District Court, 570 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1977); 
Amente v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030 (Ra. 1995); Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. 
Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358, 1360-61 (Ind. 1992); Lester E. Cox Medical Center v. Keet, 
678 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1984); Richards v. Kerlakian, 2005 Ohio 4414, H 5, 835 N.E.2d 768; 
Tanzi v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 651 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1995). 
b. Minority School of Thought 
A few jurisdictions have taken a more resolute stance against the disclosure of any 
information, regardless of the redaction of personally identifying information. This position 
appears to have underpinnings in the constitutional right to privacy. See In re Columbia 
Valley Regional Medical Center, 41 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). In Ortiz v. 
lkeda,1ot example, the trial court opined, "I am not persuaded that redaction of names 
adequately protects a patient's legitimate expectation of privacy." 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 
193, at *4-5. And in Columbia Valley, the court specifically held that under its precedents, 
the production of any portion of the patient's file constituted a breach of the constitutionally 
protected zone of privacy. 41 S.W.3d at 802. 
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In essence, the position of these courts is that information given in confidence to a 
doctor should never be produced in litigation to which they are not a party. Under this view, 
allowing the production of redacted medical records "would mean that the patient's only 
real privilege is that of having his name deleted before his intimate medical records are 
interjected into a civil lawsuit without his knowledge or consent." Ortiz, 2001 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 193, at *5. 
c. Utah's Position 
Our appellate courts have held that the purpose of the privilege is to encourage a 
patient's full disclosure to a physician "in order to receive effective medical treatment, free 
from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy that might result from the physician's 
disclosure of the information." State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
"The privilege serves to alleviate patients' fear that their medical records could be disclosed 
to the public and cause them embarrassment." Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, U 10,133 
P.3d 370. Utah's courts are instructed not to "treat the policy underlying this privilege 
lightly." Id. 
Many of Utah's appellate decisions appear to align with the majority school of 
thought because they focus primarily on preventing embarrassment to the patient. See 
e.g., Burns, 2006 UT14,«[] 10; Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88. However, an adequate redaction 
alleviates that concern because the patient is assured that the medical information cannot 
be traced back to her. Moreover, in each of Utah's decisions addressing privilege, the 
records sought would necessarily identify the patient, as they were parties to the lawsuit 
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or crime victims. See Burns, 2006 UT.14, fl 5; State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, U 27, 982 
P.2d 79; State v. Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, H 1,177 P-3d 664; Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT 
App 58,1] 11, 999 P.2d 582; Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88. 
The Court is persuaded by the majority position, which protects patients' privacy by 
preventing their identification with the produced records, rather than imposing blanket 
protection for each scrap of medical information created during a patient's care. In addition 
to litigants' need for redacted files, the Court is persuaded that the potential disclosure of 
redacted records will benefit the public interest by providing further incentives for medical 
providers to properly train and supervise medical staff. The Court therefore rejects the 
Defendant's request to interpret the privilege as absolutely preventing the disclosure of 
non-identifying medical records. 
2. Interpretation of Rule 506 
The Defendant also argues that Rule 506 lists narrow exceptions, none of which 
apply to this case. Under Rule 506, certain exceptions to the privilege have been 
enumerated, such as when a party requires the records as an element of his or her claim 
or defense. The Defendant suggests that in the absence of a specific exception in the rule 
allowing redacted medical files to be produced, the Court should not recognize one. This 
is the ultimate conclusion of a few cases. E.g., Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 435 
N.E.2d 140, 143 (III. Ct. App. 1982) (limiting the dissemination of any medical records to 
the exceptions listed in the privilege statute); Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 98-
2160, p. 8-9 (La,App. 4 Cir. 1/15/99), 727 So.2d 647 (holding that medical records do not 
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"become exempt from the mandatory requirements of [statutes requiring patient consent] 
by the redaction or removal of 'patient information'"); Columbia Valley, 41 S.W,3d at 800 
(holding that rules did not "provide authority for [party]'s contention that redaction of 
identifying information takes the records outside the scope of the nonparty's privilege.").3 
Similarly, Rule 506 does not specifically mention redaction. However, "the effect of 
. . . [a] privilege . . . [is to] close another window to the light of truth." State v. Godfrey, 598 
P.2d 1325,1327 (Utah 1979); see also Utah R. Evid. 102 ("These rules shall be construed 
. . . to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."). 
Thus, "rule 506 should be strictly construed." Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, fl 17, 133 
P.3d 370. In interpreting the Rule, the Court must refrain from stretching the canopy of 
physician-patient privilege beyond its intended scope. 
This does not mean that the Court may re-write the Rule to fit particular 
circumstances. For instance, in Burns the State sought to inspect medical files connected 
with allegedly fraudulent medical billing practices. 2006 UT 14, U 1. The Court rejected 
two arguments proffered by the State which would allow the State to do so: one based on 
a statutory exception, and one based upon a narrow interpretation of Rule 506. The Court 
rejected the State's statutory argument that the privilege did not apply because providers 
were required to release information or evidence to an insurer. See Bums, 2006 UT 14, 
3
 Although the Defendant lists Popp v. Crittenton Hospital as supporting its 
position, Popp never addressed the issue of redaction; rather, it merely held that the 
plaintiff was correctly denied a nonparty's medical records. It is unclear from the 
opinion whether the issue of redaction was even considered. 
37 
STALEY v. JOLLES PAGE 12 ORDER 
H 16; Utah Code Ann, § 31A-31-104(1)(b) (2003). The State alternatively argued that the 
court "should construe the physician-patient privilege narrowly to create an exception for 
investigations into suspected insurance fraud." Id. at H 17. Although it endorsed a narrow 
construction of the rule, the Court declined to recognize a new exception to the privilege, 
noting that the rule "contains only three explicit exceptions, none of which apply to this 
situation." Id. at 1) 18. It noted that the Committee intended "that exceptions to the 
privilege should be specifically enumerated," and that recognizing a blanket insurance 
fraud exception "would be inconsistent with the intended effect of the rule." Id. 
The Court finds Burns distinguishable, however, because that case did not deal with 
redacted medical records. The State in Burns sought medical records in unredacted form, 
and his patients' identities would be matched with their medical information. Thus, 
although Burns endorsed a strict interpretation of 506 in applying exceptions, the Court is 
not convinced that the same construction necessarily applies to medical files with personal 
information redacted. This is because sufficient redaction and protection can remove the 
records from the privilege entirely. 
The Rezulin Products court analyzed a Texas statute with similar boundaries and 
rejected an argument similar to the Defendant's. The language of the relevant rule 
imposed privilege on records of "identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient." 
178 F. Supp. 2d at 414. The court was unpersuaded by the conclusion argued by the 
medical provider, "that any record containing a diagnosis, an evaluation or a treatment, 
even if it cannot be connected with a patient, is privileged." Id. It reasoned that such a 
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construction "would lead to preposterous results. A scrap of paper upon which a physician 
had jotted down a patient's name, or wrote only the word Indigestion1 (a diagnosis) or 
'aspirin' (a treatment) or 'malingering' (an evaluation) would, or at least could, be 
privileged." Id. Instead, the Court considered the overall purpose of the rule, which is to 
prevent the disclosure of "highly personal information." Id. at 415. It reasoned that the 
removal of personally identifying information would simultaneously remove the records 
from the shield of the physician-patient privilege. Id. 
The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Rezulin Products. Although Rule 506(b) 
lists "diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given," its scope is necessarily limited 
by its purpose: to prevent the disclosure of information which can connect that information 
to the patient. It would not lead to embarrassment if a doctor is known to have made a 
particular diagnosis, performed a particular treatment, or given particular advice. The 
Court concludes that redacted medical files are not subject to the privilege's bar, so long 
as proper protective measures are in place to prevent the further dissemination of the 
discovered materials. 
3. Adequate Protection Against Identification 
The underlying premise of the majority position on redacted files is that patient 
identification will be made impossible through redaction. However, at least one court has 
denied access to redacted medical information based upon fears that redaction would be 
inadequate to protect patients1 identities. In Parkson, the plaintiff argued that redaction 
would avoid a violation of physician-patient privilege. 435 N.E.2d at143. The Court 
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rejected this argument, reasoning that "[wjhether the patients' identities would remain 
confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is questionable at 
best," Id. at 144. It explained that the "discharge summaries arguably contain histories of 
the patients' prior and present medical conditions, information that in the cumulative can 
make the possibility of recognition very high." Id. 
The Court is unpersuaded by this speculative argument because it excludes medical 
files without allowing the court to assess the specific circumstances of each case and 
determine whether there is any probable threat that identity will be linked to a file. In 
support of its reasoning, the Parkson court cited Doe v. Roe, a case in which a psychiatrist 
published a book detailing his conversations with a patient over many years, including 
stories of the patient's life history and intimate details of his marriage as it dissolved. 400 
N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). This is an extreme example, and one taken out 
of context. First, redaction of personally identifying information is not necessarily limited 
to the name and address of the patient, but could include eliminating references to other 
personally identifying information, such as locations of family, employment, and accounts 
of particularly unique or well-known life events.4 Second, unlike Doe, where the 
psychiatrist published a book detailing his patient's private information, the discovered 
materials in this lawsuit would be subject to a protective order preventing their 
dissemination beyond their use in the lawsuit, and requiring their return upon the 
4
 For example, a narrative of the cause of injury, if unique or widely publicized, 
could be sufficiently redacted to prevent identification. 
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conclusion of the case. 
The employment of a protective order is particularly important to preventing patient 
identification. Numerous courts have held that protective orders are necessary when 
redacted medical records are produced in litigation. In Bennett v. Fieser, a plaintiff sought 
the medical file of a burn patient whose arrival allegedly diverted a doctor from caring for 
the plaintiff. 152 F.R.D. 641, 642 (D. Kan. 1994). Although the plaintiff in that case agreed 
that identifying information could be redacted, he also stated that he would attempt to 
contact that patient and call him as a fact witness. Id. The Court first determined that the 
privilege would not apply due to the record's redaction, and specifically addressed the 
argument raised in Parkson. It recognized that in some situations, "providing medical 
records with names and identifying information removed could nonetheless provide vital 
clues which would assist a party in identifying the non-party patient." Id. at 643. It found 
that an adequate remedy for this problem was an order "that the parties and counsel shall 
make no effort to learn the identity of the patient or attempt to contact the patient." Id. 
Other courts have approved similar protective orders. See In re The American Tobacco 
Co., 880 F.2d 1520,1530 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming imposition of protective order requiring 
redaction of names, street addresses, towns or villages, social security numbers, 
employers, and union registration numbers); Richards, 2005 Ohio 4414, U 8 (requiring 
court to craft protective order to protect against "indiscriminate dissemination" of redacted 
medical records). 
The Court concludes that a protective order which limits the medical records to 
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review only by counsel and experts, and prevents any party from attempting to discover the 
identity of the patient or contact the patient, sufficiently guards against the remote 
possibility that the information will provide clues to the patient's identity. The Court rejects 
the argument proffered by Parkson, which would apply an absolute bar regardless of the 
circumstances of the particular case. 
4. Circumstances of this Case 
In its reply memorandum, the Defendant argued that the need to protect patient 
privacy, even if not requiring a blanket prohibition of disclosure, is not outweighed by the 
Plaintiffs need for the medical records in this case. It relies principally upon In re Christus 
Health Southeast Texas, a Texas Court of Appeals case in which a plaintiff sought non-
party medical records to demonstrate that patients with lower acuity were allowed to remain 
in an emergency room while she was turned away. 167 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2005). As in this case, the parties agreed that the information was relevant to the plaintiff's 
claim, but the hospital argued that the privacy rights of its patients should not be overcome 
merely upon a showing of relevance. The court agreed, explaining that '"relevance alone 
cannot be the test, because such a test would ignore the fundamental purpose of 
evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence 
under prescribed circumstances.'" Id. at 602 (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 
842 (Tex. 1994)). The Ramirez court previously held: 
Communications and records should not be subject to discovery if the 
patient's condition is merely an evidentiary or intermediate issue of fact, 
rather than an 'ultimate' issue for a claim or defense, or if the condition is 
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merely tangential to a claim rather than 'central' to it 
887 S. W.2d at 842-43. The Christus Health court remanded to the trial court to determine 
whether the records were merely intermediate issues of fact, or whether they related to the 
ultimate issue of her claim. 167 S.W.3d at 603. 
Other courts have required the courts to make decisions regarding privilege on a 
case-by-case basis, weighing the relevance of the requested documents against the 
privacy interests. See Wilfong v. Shaeperkoetter, 933 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Mo. 1996) ("The 
circumstances, facts and interests of justice determine the applicability of the physician-
patient privilege to a particular situation."') (citation omitted). For instance, in Richards v. 
Kerlakian, the plaintiff sought redacted non-party medical records to prosecute its claim for 
negligent credentialing. 835 N.E.2d 768, 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). The Court concluded 
that the records must be produced because they were necessary "to develop a primary 
claim" against the hospital. Id. at 770. The Richards court noted that it was "difficult to 
imagine how else the negligent-credentialing claim could have been investigated without 
the disputed documents." Id. 
The Court concludes that it should weigh the need for the non-party medical records 
against the privacy concerns of the patients when considering whether to order the 
disclosure of those records. When the records are only slightly relevant, such as those to 
be used solely as impeachment evidence, disclosure may be inappropriate. But when the 
records represent important evidence in support of a claim, their disclosure in redacted 
form is more appropriate. The Rules emphasize the importance of the medical records to 
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the case itself in determining whether the privilege exists. See Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1). 
In addition, the Court will address any concerns that a patient could be identified despite 
redaction. 
On the side of discovery, the Plaintiff seeks records which will essentially be 
rendered anonymous, for the limited purpose of assessing whether the nurse caring for 
those patients was overextended. Due to the hospital's policy of not keeping a non-
confidential record of patient acuity, reference to the medical records appears to be the 
only way for an expert to assess acuity. Patient acuity is a key component to the Plaintiff's 
claim of gross negligence. This weighs in favor of disclosure. 
Of course, the question of patient acuity is only a part of the Plaintiffs claim for 
gross negligence, and reference to the medical records are not the only basis upon which 
the Plaintiff could present evidence of such negligence. This makes the Plaintiffs need 
for the medical records slightly less compelling. 
The Defendant contends that "in such a case as this which involves multiple 
members of the same relatively small community," redacted medical files may not 
adequately protect patient confidentiality. This argument would apply in certain 
circumstances. For instance, the Rezulin court recounted the facts underlying a Texas 
Court of Appeals case in which the court declined to release redacted medical files when 
the non-party patient was a "long time resident'" of Goliad County, Texas and the request 
related to the care of males in a particular nursing home. 178 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (quoting 
In re Diversicare General Pamter, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)). The 
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Rezulin court noted that the male population of Goliad County had only 533 members over 
the age of sixty-five, and that a smaller number of those men would have received care in 
a nursing home. Id. (citing 2000 United States Census). It distinguished Diversicare 
because the facts underlying the Rezulin case did not have similar implications. Like the 
Rezulin court, this Court could envision similar circumstances in some care facilities, such 
as those in Utah's rural communities, in which the disclosure of redacted files to local 
attorneys and experts would not adequately protect against patient identification. 
But those are not the facts of this case. Although Utah is not overwhelmingly 
populous state when compared to others, the 2000 census showed that nearly 900,000 
people resided in Salt Lake County alone.5 This renders the potential for identification from 
redacted records highly improbable. In addition, as one of the few large hospitals in the 
region, St. Mark's provides facilities for residents of neighboring counties and states, 
increasing the potential pool of patients. Moreover, the medical records requested in this 
case relate solely to a surgical recovery wing; a patient's presence on that wing does not 
imply any particular type of surgery or ailment. While the Court concludes that it is 
appropriate to consider the risk of identification from redacted medical files, it finds that 
there are no such concerns in this case. 
Given that the privacy of the non-party patients will be adequately protected by 
5
 See U.S. Bureau of Census, DP-1 Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics: 2000, Data Set: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) and Summary 
File 3 (SF 3), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/49/49035.html. 
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redaction and a protective order, and considering the Plaintiff's need for the records, the 
Court finds it necessary for the Defendant to disclose the records of the six patients for 
whom Ms. Stallings provided care. These records will be redacted and subject to a 
protective order which restricts review of the medical files to attorneys6 and expert 
witnesses, prohibiting them from using or disclosing those records outside of litigation, and 
requiring the return of those records at the conclusion of the litigation.7 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
6
 By this, the Court emphasizes its intent to limit review to attorneys involved in 
this case; paralegals and other support staff will not be permitted to assist in preparing 
or reviewing the redacted medical files. 
7
 The protective order in this case should satisfy the requirements of HIPAA, 
which mandates a "qualified protective order" which prohibits a party from using or 
disclosing the information for any purpose other than the litigation and requiring the 
return or destruction of the medical records at the end of the proceedings. See 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(2)(v)(A) and (B). 
46 
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ORDER 
The Court overrules the Defendant's objection to discovery, and grants the Plaintiffs 
motion to compel production. The Defendant shall produce the medical files of the six 
patients for whom Ms. Stallings provided care, and which formed the basis of Ms. Chen's 
opinion. The Defendant shall redact personally identifying information from the copies 
provided. These medical records shall be subject to a protective order which limits their 
dissemination to counsel and experts, and shall be returned to the Defendants at the 
conclusion of this case. 
DATED thisifL day of May, 2008. 
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